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Abstract
In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the
game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the speciﬁc
game actually played. Typically, information structures that deter-
mine diﬀerent signals, induce diﬀerent equilibrium payoﬀs. In zero-
sum games the equilibrium payoﬀ measures the value of the partic-
ular information structure which induces it. We pose a question as
to what restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of infor-
mation. We provide answers in two kinds of information structures:
symmetric, where both players are equally informed, and one-sided
where only one player is informed.
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Markets or strategic interactions are typically not observable in full detail
to the outside observer, may it be an econometrician or an analyst. Either
the utilities of the agents or the actions available to them are unobservable.
Frequently, only the outcome of the interaction is observable, if at all. The
question arises as to what conditions the observable data should satisfy in
order to be consistent with an underlying theoretical model. Stated diﬀer-
ently, what restrictions on the outcomes of an interaction does the underlying
model impose?
Afriat (1967) examined a situation where only ﬁnitely many observations
of prices and consumption-bundles of an agent are available. Afriat’s theorem
(see also Varian, 1984) states that these observations may constitute a ﬁnite
sample from a demand function induced by a continuous, concave and mono-
tonic utility, if and only if a certain revealed preference condition is satisﬁed.
Sonnenschein (1973), Debreu (1974) and Mantel (1974) examined functions
that map prices to bundles. They questioned under what conditions such
functions might convey the excess demand of a market with utility maxi-
mizing agents. It turns out that any function can be derived from rational
individuals who maximize their utility.
This paper refers to strategic interactions and poses questions of a similar
spirit. The exact speciﬁcations of the game played are unobservable to the
outside observer. Only the payoﬀs received by the agents are knowable. In
this case, what conditions should these payoﬀs satisfy in order to be consistent
with the equilibrium paradigm of interactive models?
More speciﬁcally, consider a Bayesian game in which agents might receive
information regarding the actual game played. As in Aumann (1974), we
1model the information structure in a Bayesian game by a partition of the
state-space into disjoint cells: a player is informed of the cell containing the
realized state. The information structure of the game obviously aﬀects the
behavior of the agents; it determines the equilibrium payoﬀs. Thus, in a
given Bayesian game, any set of state-space partitions, one for each player, is
associated with equilibrium payoﬀs of the induced (incomplete information)
game. However, while all the details of the game, including the agents’ action
sets and the payoﬀs associated with any combination of agents’ actions, are
usually unobservable to the economist, the outcomes of the game frequently
are.
The data available to the economist about the game includes all possible
information structures and the payoﬀs associated with them. As in Afriat
(1967) we look for conditions that data should satisfy in order to be consistent
with a rational behavior of the agents in Bayesian games.
Another purpose of the paper is to study those properties essential to the
functions that measures the value of information, as well as the role of infor-
mation in Bayesian games and its eﬀect on equilibrium payoﬀs. When the
information structure changes typically the equilibrium payoﬀs also change.
Specially interesting questions are: what is the extent to which information
aﬀects the outcome of the interaction; are there limitations on the way in-
formation aﬀects the outcome; and whether the contribution of additional
information should be related in any particular way to the information al-
ready available?
As a ﬁrst step in studying the aforementioned questions, we restrict our-
selves to zero-sum games. The main advantage of these games is that they
have a unique equilibrium payoﬀ − the value. This implies that any infor-
mation structure is associated with a unique equilibrium payoﬀ rather than
with multiple equilibrium payoﬀs. Furthermore, in zero-sum games the eﬀect
of getting more information is always positive: the equilibrium payoﬀ cannot
decrease as a result of receiving more information.
2A Bayesian zero-sum game can be also perceived as a one-player decision
problem under uncertainty when the decision-maker has a prior over her own
payoﬀ functions while she has no prior over the states nature may choose.
Consider a decision-maker who takes a decision and then receives a payoﬀ
which depends also on the state nature chooses. Neither the payoﬀ function
nor the state of nature is known.
The payoﬀ function reﬂects the decision-maker’s own preferences, and
therefore, she might have a prior over the possible payoﬀ functions that
may be relevant at the time the payoﬀ is given. The state of nature, how-
ever, might be subject to complete ignorance: the decision-maker might have
no assessment or hypothesis regarding the distribution of the states nature
chooses. In such a situation a worst case analysis of nature’s choice suggests
that nature is malicious and it tries to minimize the decision-maker’s payoﬀ.
Thus, in eﬀect, the decision-maker plays a Bayesian zero-sum game against
nature.
The value-of-information function of a Bayesian zero-sum game maps
each possible information structure to the corresponding equilibrium pay-
oﬀ. We characterize those real-valued functions deﬁned over the information
structures that can be realized by an underlying Bayesian game, as value-of-
information functions. That is, we specify the properties of functions over
the state-space partitions that are necessary and suﬃcient for being value-
of-information functions.
The issue of measuring the value of information has been previously ad-
dressed in the case of one decision-maker by Gilboa and Lehrer (1991). They
characterized those functions that measure the value of information in op-
timization problems, where the decision-maker gets to know an equivalent
class of states, rather than the realized state itself. In this paper we extend
the model of Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) to zero-sum games and determine
what kind of functions (of information) might measure the value of informa-
3tion. We answer this question in two polar cases: symmetric information in
which the partitions of both players coincide and thus both obtain the same
information about the state of nature; and one-sided information in which
one player gets some information about the state of nature while the other
does not.
In the case of symmetric information both players are equally informed,
and after being informed they actually play another Bayesian game which
is restricted to the states within the informed cell. Therefore, the value
of the original Bayesian game is the expected value of the Bayesian game
played aposteriori. In other words, the value of the Bayesian game is a
weighted sum of the values of the restricted Bayesian games played after
the players have been informed. This implies, in particular, that a value-of-
information function of a symmetric information game should be additively
separable. It turns out that this very condition characterizes all possible
value-of-information functions: any additively separable function over parti-
tions is a value-of-information function.
When the information is one-sided, reﬁning the partition of the informed
player increases her equilibrium payoﬀ. Thus, any value-of-information func-
tion must be monotonic (with respect to reﬁnement). Our conclusion con-
cerning one-sided information states that, unlike the case of one-player de-
cision problems, no further condition beyond monotonicity is required to
characterize the value-of-information functions.
To summarize, in both types of information structures − the symmetric
and the one-sided − the obvious necessary conditions (i.e., additivity in the
symmetric case and monotonicity in the one-sided case) are also suﬃcient to
guarantee consistency with the equilibrium paradigm of Bayesian games.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and
the main issues treated by the paper. In Sections 3 and 4 we present the
two main results: the characterizing of the value-of-information functions in
symmetric and one-sided information structures. In Section 5 we prove these
4results. Section 6 reviews related literature and Section 7 is devoted to ﬁnal
comments.
2 The model
In this section we give a more formal content to the question asked in the in-
troduction. We ﬁrst deﬁne information structures and then model a bayesian
game for each possible information structure. Given this game we deﬁne the
notion of value of information and then characterize the functions that are
value of information for some bayesian game.
2.1 Information structures
We consider an incomplete information game preceded by a phase in which
the players may obtain some partial information about the exact game to be
played. Before the game starts, a state of nature k is drawn from a ﬁnite
set K according to a known probability p. None of the players is directly
informed of the realized state k. The players receive signals that depends
on k through an information structure. This information structure is the
main subject of this study and is to be distinguished from the uncertainty
embedded in p and k.
Let P1 and P2 be two partitions of the state space K. The signal player
i receives about k in the atom of Pi that contains k. Formally,
Deﬁnition 1 A partitional information structure I = (P1,P2) consists of
two partitions of K: Si for player i, i = 1,2.
An information structure in general is a device that associates (random)
private signals (provided to the players) with the payoﬀ-relevant information.
In the model discussed here, the payoﬀ-relevant information is the state. It is
clear that partitional information structures are a speciﬁc class of information
5structures. On the other hand, it can be shown that that any information
structure can be modelled as a partitional information structure with a new
set of parameters (see for instance, Lehrer and Rosenberg, 2003).
In this paper we focus on two speciﬁc kinds of information structures:
symmetric information in which both players receive the same signal and
one-sided information in which only one player receives information while
the other does not.
Deﬁnition 2 A partitional information structure I = (P1,P2) is symmetric
if both partitions are equal. That is, P1 = P2.
Deﬁnition 3 A partitional information structure I = (P1,P2) is one-sided
if only player 1 receives information. That is, if the partition P2 is trivial
(i.e., contains only one set, K).
2.2 The game
The bayesian game is deﬁned by a ﬁnite state space K; a probability distri-
bution over K, p; a ﬁnite actions set for each player, A1 and A2; and ﬁnally,
a payoﬀ function, gk, deﬁned on A1 × A2 for each k ∈ K.
The game associated with the information structure I = (P1,P2) is played
as follows. Before the game starts a state of nature k ∈ K is drawn according
to the distribution p. None of the players observe k. However, player i
observes the cell of the partition Pi to which k belongs. Then both players
simultaneously choose an action ai ∈ Ai and get the payoﬀ gk(a1,a2). Player
1 tries to maximizes the expected payoﬀ while player 2 tries to minimize it.
This game can be put in a normal form. A pure strategy of player i
is a function, τi, that associates an action in Ai to each cell B ∈ Pi. For
each Bi ∈ Pi and each ai ∈ Ai, τiBi(ai) denotes the probability that player
i plays action ai if he is informed of Bi. Let Bi(k) denote the cell of Pi






a2∈A2 τ1B1(k)(a1)τ2B2(k)(a2)gk(a1,a2). This game is a ﬁ-
nite game and therefore has a value denoted by vP1,P2(p,(gk)k∈K).
2.3 Measuring the contribution of information
We now deﬁne the value of information in a bayesian game. Consider game
with a state space K, payoﬀ functions (gk)k∈K and a distribution p over K.
The value-of-information function of this game is V (I) = vI(p,(gk)k∈K). The
main issue of this paper is to characterize the value-of-information functions.
Formally, let V (I) be a function over partitional information structures I.
The question arises as to when this function is a value-of-information function
of some game. If the properties of the functions that are values of information
for some bayesian game are restrictive, it means that the bayesian model
imposes restrictions on the way information is valued when it varies.
In the case of one decision maker this problem has been analyzed by
Gilboa and Lehrer (1991). They characterize the functions of partitions
deﬁned on the set of partitions that are the value of information of ﬁnite
games.
Deﬁnition 4 Let V be a function deﬁned over all the partitions of a ﬁnite
set K. V is separately additive if there is a function v, deﬁned over subsets
of K, such that for any partition P, V (P) =
P
B∈P v(B).
Notation 1 If ∅ 6= T ⊆ B ⊆ K and (xi)i∈B is a vector, then x(T) denotes
P
i∈T xi, and x(∅) = 0.
Deﬁnition 5 For B ⊆ K, the B-anti-core of v is non empty if there is a
vector (xi)i∈B, such that x(T) ≤ v(T) for every T ⊆ B.
Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) showed that a function V deﬁned over all the
partitions of a ﬁnite set K is a value-of-information function of a one-player
decision making problem with state space K if and only if it has the following
two properties.
7(i) V is separately additive: V (P) =
P
B∈P v(B); and
(ii) for any B ⊂ K, the B-anti-core of v is non empty.
Moreover, the underlying probability distribution over K can be any, as
long as the support is the entire K (i.e., any k ∈ K is assigned a positive
probability).
Condition (i) is clearly necessary in a one-player decision problem for the fol-
lowing reason. Let P be a partition and B ∈ P. Deﬁne v(B) as maxa∈A1
P
k∈B p(k)gk(a).
The value of the decision problem V (P) has to be
P
B∈P v(B). This require-
ment will be extended to the case of two-player zero-sum games with sym-
metric information.
In Sections 3 and 4 we study analogous questions in zero-sum games with
symmetric and one-sided partitional information. Note that the one-player
case is a particular case of a zero-sum game (player 2 has only one action).
However, since the number of actions available to each player is not speciﬁed
in the condition, there are more zero-sum games than one player decision
problems and therefore more functions of partitions that can be a value of
information of zero-sum game than of one-player decision problems. Thus,
the conditions that characterize value-of-information functions of zero-sum
games are weaker than those characterizing value-of-information functions of
one-player decision problems.
3 The value of symmetric partitional infor-
mation
In this section we focus on zero-sum games with symmetric partitional infor-
mation.
Deﬁnition 6 A function V deﬁned over all the partitions of K is a value-
of-information function of a partitional symmetric information game if there
8is a distribution p over K and payoﬀ functions (gk)k∈K such that for any
partition P of K, V (P) = vP,P(p,(gk)k∈K).












Suppose that the probability of state k = 1 is p. If no player is informed of
the state selected, the players actually play the game whose matrix is

1 0
0 1 − p

.
The value of this game is
1−p
2−p. On the other hand, if the players are informed
of the game selected, then with probability p the value of the game played is
0 and with probability 1 − p the value of the game played is 1
2. Thus, the
average of the Bayesian game is
1−p
2 .
To sum up, there are two possible partitional symmetric information struc-
ture: the trivial, T , where no information about the state selected is being
in given to the players, and the perfect one (that corresponds to the discrete
partition), D, where both players are fully informed of the state selected. The
value-of-information function in this case is therefore given by , V (T ) =
1−p
2−p
and V (D) =
1−p
2 . One can see that the additional information given by D is
harmful for player 1.
We are now ready to characterize the functions over partitions that are values
of information of zero sum games with symmetric information.
Theorem 1 Let V be a function deﬁned over all the partitions of K then V is
the value of information of a game with symmetric partitional information if
and only if V is separately additive. Moreover, if V is separately additive then
for any probability distribution on K with full support there are payoﬀ func-
tions (gk)k∈K such that for any partition P over K, V (P) = vP,P(p,(gk)k∈K).
9Note that as in the case of one decision maker it is easy to prove that
additivity is a necessary condition. Indeed, for a ﬁxed partition P, there
is one diﬀerent mixed action for each player for each atom of the partition.
Therefore V (P) can be written as the sum for all atoms B of the partitions
of functions v(B) where v(B) is the value of the matrix game with action
sets A1 and A2 and payoﬀ functions
P
k∈B p(k)gk(·,·).
Therefore, the main contribution of this theorem is to state that no fur-
ther condition beyond additivity is needed for a function to be the value of
information of a zero-sum game with symmetric information. This means
that in a games with symmetric information the impact of information can
be literally unlimited (as long as additivity is preserved). Information may
have a positive or a negative contribution, and it may alternate arbitrarily
between having positive and negative eﬀects, as the information increases.
Furthermore, the marginal contribution of additional information may be ar-
bitrarily small or large. In other words imposing a bayesian model does not
impose additional restrictions on the impact of information on the outcome
of an interaction. This means that if information is symmetric, bayesianism
cannot be rejected as a model on the grounds of the impact of additional
information on the value of a zero sum game.
The proof of Theorem 1 is postponed to section 5.
4 One-sided information structures
In this section we discuss the case where one player, typically the maximizer,
receives some information about the state selected, while the other player
receives no information. Formally, player 1 will be informed of the cell of
partition P, while the other player will be informed of the trivial partition,
T .
Deﬁnition 7 A function V deﬁned over all the partitions of K is a value-
of-information function of a game with partitional one-sided information if
10there is a distribution p over K and payoﬀ functions (gk)k∈K such that for
any partition P over K, V (P) = vP,T (p,(gk)k∈K).
Deﬁnition 8 A function V from the set of partitions of a ﬁnite set K to
the real numbers is said to be monotonic if for two partitions P and P0 such
that P is a reﬁnement of P0 (i.e., any B0 ∈ P0 is a union of atoms B ∈ P),
then V (P) ≥ V (P0).
Example 2 Recall Example 1 and consider one-sided partitional informa-
tion. When the information is trivial, then the value, as in Example 1 is
1−p
2−p. However, when player 1 is fully informed of the state and player 2





p 1 − p
1 − p 0




The value of this game is 1
2 if p ≤ 1
2 and 1−p if p > 1
2. Note that this game is
the one-sided partitional information corresponding to the discrete partition
D.
We conclude by writing the value-of-information function of this one-
sided partitional information: V (T ) =
1−p
2−p and V (D) = 1
2 if p ≤ 1
2 and
V (D) = 1 − p if p > 1




2−p for p ≤ 1
2 and 1 − p ≥
1−p
2−p for p > 1
2.
It is clear that in zero-sum games when only one player receives additional
information, the value increases. Thus, the value-of-information functions of
games with one-sided partitional information must be monotonic. It turns
out, as the following theorem states, that monotonicity is not only necessary
but also suﬃcient for being a value-of -information function of a game with
one-sided partitional information. As in the symmetric case, there is no
restriction (as long as monotonicity is preserved) on the possible impacts of
11information on the outcome of an interaction for diﬀerent payoﬀ functions,
and the study of the impact of information on the value cannot help in
accepting or rejecting the bayesian model as an explanatory model..
Theorem 2 A function V from the set of partitions of a ﬁnite set K is
value-of-information function of a partitional one-sided information game if
and only if it is monotonic.
The proof of this theorem will be given in the next section.
5 Proofs of the theorems
5.1 The proof of Theorem 1.
We ﬁrst prove that if V is a value of information function of a zero-sum game
with symmetric information then it has to be additive. Recall that since each
player knows the set of the partition P to which k belongs, the strategies τ1
and τ2 of player 1 and player 2 are functions from the sets of the partition
to probabilities over A1 and A2 respectively. We will denote for B ∈ P, τ1B
(resp. τ2B) the mixed action corresponding to the information B. Therefore



































Thus, V is additive.
Assume now that V is an additive function on partition, we want to prove
that it is a value of information function. In order to prove this result we
12will use the following proposition (theorem ???) from Lehrer and Rosenberg
(2003).
Proposition 1 Let f be any polynomial from the set of probability distribu-
tions over K to the reals. There exist two ﬁnite sets A1 and A2, and a func-
tion gk from A1 × A2 to the reals, for each k ∈ K, such that the value of the
game with the action sets A1 and A2 and the payoﬀ function
P
k∈K pkgk(·,·)
is f(p), for any p. This game is called a game with no information.
Take p any probability distribution with full support on K. For any subset
B of K we denote by pB the conditional probability on B namely pB(k) =
p(k)/p(B) if k ∈ B (and 0 otherwise).
Let f be a polynomial deﬁned on ∆(K) such that for any subset B of K,
f(pB) = h(B)/p(B). Such a polynomial exists (note that for B diﬀerent from
B0, pB is diﬀerent from pB0). Now Proposition 1 implies that there are payoﬀ
functions (gk)k∈K such that the value u of the game with no information and
payoﬀs (gk)k∈K satisﬁes u = f.



















































which is the desired result.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 makes use of the following proposition.
13Refer to the probabilities of the various one-player decision
problems in the proof.
Proposition 2 A function V from the set of partitions of a ﬁnite set K is
value-of-information function of a partitional one-sided information game if
and only if it is a minimum of ﬁnitely many value-of-information functions
of one-player decision making problems.
Proof. Let V be the value-of-information function of the game G with K
being its state space. We prove that it is the minimum of ﬁnitely many value
of information functions for one player decision making problems. Consider
the following auxiliary multi-stage game, ¯ G. At the beginning player 2 an-
nounces a mixed strategy, then a state is chosen with respect to the prior
distribution p and player 1 is informed of the cell of the appropriate partition
that contains this state. Finally, player 1 takes an action and an action of
player 2 is selected according to the mixed strategy previously announced.
Obviously the values of ¯ G and G coincide. Moreover, the optimal strate-
gies in both games also coincide. Denote by yP an optimal strategy of player
2 in the one-sided information game induced by the partition P.
Consider a ﬁxed partition P. In ¯ G, after player 2 announces yP, player 1
actually faces a one-player decision problem, denoted DP. DP is deﬁned by
the state space K and some payoﬀ functions. Denote by D
Q
P the one-player
decision problem DP when the partitional information is induced by Q. The
value of this problem is denoted by U
Q
P . Note that V (P) coincides with UP
P .
Since yP is an optimal strategy of player 2 in the game with one-sided
information induced by the partition P, UP
P ≤ U
Q
P for any partition Q. Thus,
for any P, V (P) = minQU
Q
P , which completes the proof of necessity.
As for suﬃciency, suppose that V is the minimum of ﬁnitely many val-
ues of one-player decision making problems: D1,..,Dn. That is, if Ui(P)
denotes the value of Di when the information is induces by P, then V (P) =
min1≤i≤n Ui(P). We need to show a zero-sum game whose value is V .
14Consider the following multi-stage game, G. Player 2 chooses a whole
number from 1,...,n ,say r, then a state k is chosen, player 1 is informed of
the cell containing this state, and ﬁnally player 1 takes an action, say a. The
payoﬀ of player 1 is the payoﬀ that corresponds to the action a and the state
k in the decision problem Dr.
Note that for any partition P, the value of G when the information is
induced by P is min1≤i≤n Ui(P). Thus, the value of information of G coincides
with V , as desired.
Deﬁnition 9 Let F be an algebra of subsets of K. That is, F consists
of subsets of K and it is closed under unions and intersections. Let v be
a real function deﬁned over F. We say that the anti-core of (v,F) is not
empty, if for every A ∈ F there is a vector xA such that xA(A) = v(A) and
xA(B) ≤ v(B) for every B ⊆ A such that B ∈ F.
Remark 1 Suppose that F is the set of all subsets of K. The anti-core of
(v,F) is not empty implies that the B-anti-core of v is not empty for every
B ⊆ K.
Lemma 1 Let F1 and F2 be two algebras of subsets of K such that F1 ⊆ F2.
Assume that the anti-core of (v,F1) is not empty. Then, for every constants
cB, B ∈ F2 \ F1 there is u deﬁned on F2 which coincides with v on F1 and
satisﬁes u(S) ≥ cS for every S ∈ F2 \ F1, such that the anti-core of (u,F2)
is not empty.
Proof. Suppose that the algebra G2 reﬁnes the algebra G1. We say that G2
is generated from G1 by splitting an atom of G1 into two subsets, if there is
an atom A of G1, and a partition of A into two subsets B and B0 that belong
to G2, such that any set C ∈ G2 can be written as C = C1 ∪C2 with C1 ∈ G1
and C2 ∈ {B,B0,∅}.
Without loss of generality we can assume that F2 is generated from F1 by
splitting an atom of F1 into two subsets. This is so because when F2 reﬁnes
15F1, any cell of F1 is a union of cells of F2. Thus, by ﬁnitely many successive
splits of sets into two subsets one can generate F2 from F1. Therefore, if the
lemma is proven for any two algebras such that the ﬁrst is generated from
the second by splitting an atom in the second into two sets, one can apply
it successively and obtain the desired result for any two algebras that one
reﬁnes the other.
Let B ∈ F2 \ F1 be a set that does not contain any set from F1. That
is, B is a proper subset of A ∈ F1 (i.e., B is a result of splitting A into two
subsets). Thus, the sets of F2 are of the type D∪E, where D ∈ {B,A\B,∅}
and E ∈ F1.
Since the anti-core of (v,F1) is not empty, for every A ∈ F1 there is a
vector xA that satisﬁes the conditions described in Deﬁnition 9. For D =
B,A \ B, set dD = maxA; D⊆A and A∈F1 xA(D) and let bD > dD. Deﬁne u as
follows: u coincides with v on F1; u(D) = bD for D = B,A \ B and ﬁnally,
for D ∪ E, where D = B,A \ B and E ∈ F1, u(D ∪ E) = u(D) + u(E).
Note that if bD, D = B,A\B are large enough, then u(S) ≥ cS for every
S ∈ F2 \ F1, as desired. It remains to show that the anti-core of (v,F2) is
not empty.
Fix A ∈ F1. If C ⊆ A and C 6∈ F1, then by the deﬁnition of dC and
since bC > dC, u(C) > xA(C). If however C ⊆ A and C ∈ F1, then
u(C) = v(C) ≥ xA(C).
Now ﬁx A ∈ F2 \ F1. A = D ∪ E, where D = B,A \ B and E ∈ F1.
Deﬁne xA as follows. On the set E, xA coincides with xE, while on D the
restriction of xA is an arbitrary vector whose sum is u(D). Let D ∪ C ⊆ A,
where C ⊆ E is in F1. Then1, xA(D∪C) = xA(D)+xA(C) ≥ u(D)+v(C) =
u(D) + u(C) = u(D ∪ C) which completes the proof that the anti-core of
(u,F2) is not empty.
Notation 2 Denote by A(P) the algebra generated by P.
1Recall Notation 1.
16Proof of Theorem 2. Let V be a monotonic function deﬁned over the
set of partitions of a set K. We prove that it is a value of information. By
Proposition 2 of Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) it is suﬃcient to show: (i) there
are v1,...,vn where vi is such that for any B ⊂ K, the B-anti-core of vi is
non empty; and (ii) for any partition P, V (P) = mini
P
A∈P vi(A).
For any partition P we will ﬁnd vP whose B-anti-core is non empty for







any partition Q. This will imply the result.
Fix a partition P and deﬁne vP(A) for A ∈ P so that
P
A∈P vP(A) =
V (P). Extend the deﬁnition of vP to A(P) in a linear fashion. Note that
this can be done in a unique way since any element of A(P) can be written





A∈Q vP(A) ≥ V (Q). The last inequality is by
monotonicity of V .
Since vP is linear on A(P), the anti-core of (vP,A(P)) is not empty.
This is so for the following reason. Fix A ∈ P and let xA be any |K|
dimensional vector with two properties. First, the support of xA is A (i.e.,
all the coordinates out of A are zeros); and second, xA(A) = vP(A). Deﬁne
x =
P






A∈P xA(A ∩ B) =
P
A∈P and A⊆B xA(A) (because P is a partition of K).
Therefore, x(B) =
P
A∈P and A⊆B vP(A) = vP(B) (the last equality is due to
the linearity of vP on A(P)). Thus, for B ∈ A(P), x satisﬁes x(B) = vP(B)
and the anti-core of (vP,A(P)) is not empty.
We extend vP to the set of all the subsets of K. On every partition Q,
vP should satisfy the linear inequality
P
A∈Q vP(A) ≥ V (Q). Consider the
following set of linear inequalities with the variables cA, A ⊆ K.
P
A∈Q cA ≥
V (Q), for every partition Q; cA = vP(A) if A ∈ A(P). This set of inequalities
can be written as a set of inequalities with the set of variables cA, A ⊆
K and A 6∈ A(P), where all the inequalities are of the type ”greater than or
equal to” and the coeﬃcients are either 0 or 1. Such a system has a solution.
17Moreover, if (cA)A⊆K and A6∈A(P) is a solution then, (cA + fA)A⊆K and A6∈A(P),
is also a solution, whenever fA ≥ 0.
Now ﬁx a solution (cA) and use the previous lemma with F1 = A(P)
and F2 be the set of all subsets of K. We obtain vP that coincides with vP
on P. Moreover, it satisﬁes vP(A) ≥ cA and therefore, it satisﬁes the set





A∈Q vQ(A) for every Q. Finally, the anti-core of (vP,F2) is non-
empty. Thus, by Remark 1 it completes the proof that a monotonic function
is a value-of-information function.
We prove now the inverse direction: if V is a value of information it has
to be monotonic. Note that if P is a reﬁnement of Q, then in a one-sided
information game induced by P player 1 has more strategies than in the game
with information induced by Q. Indeed, for any strategy τ of player 1 in the
game with information structure Q denote by τB the action prescribed by
τ when the state chosen is in the cell B ∈ P. Deﬁne the following strategy
of player 1 in the game with the information structure P. When the state
chosen is in C ∈ P, where C ⊆ B ∈ P, play according to τB.
Since the set of strategies of player 2 is the same under both information
structures, the value is higher in the game with information structure P than
in the game with information structure Q. This proves monotonicity.
6 Related Literature
Most of the existing literature that relates to the role of information in in-
teractive models compares diﬀerent information structures. Blackwell (1951,
1953) initiated this trend when he characterized in the context of one-player
decision problems when one information structure always provides at least
as high payoﬀ as another information structure. Gossner and Mertens (2001)
compared diﬀerent information structures in zero-sum games and Lehrer and
Rosenberg (2003) did it in long-run repeated zero-sum games. Gossner (2000)
18compared the sets of correlated equilibrium distributions induced by diﬀerent
information structures. Gossner (2003) showed that the case where a player
has in one game more strategies that in another can be interpreted as having
more information.
Hirshleifer (1971) noted that in economic situations additional informa-
tion does not necessarily imply greater payoﬀs for the agent. When the game
is non-zero-sum, players might prefer dropping payoﬀ-relevant information.
This might happen when the equilibrium payoﬀs of the better informed player
are lower than her equilibrium payoﬀs before receiving the additional infor-
mation. This phenomenon is exempliﬁed in Kamien et al. (1990). Bassan et
al. (1999) introduced conditions that guarantee that getting more informa-
tion always improves all players’ payoﬀs. Neyman (1991) pointed out that
a player might prefer not receiving information because other players would
know that he was receiving this information.
7 Final Remarks
7.1 Non zero-sum games
In this paper we characterize the functions that are value of information
functions for zero sum games. In the non zero sum case one could deﬁne for
a game the value of information correspondence that associates to each in-
formation structure the set of corresponding Nash equilibrium payoﬀs. Then
characterizing the set of Nash equilibrium correspondences even for symmet-
ric or one sided information is an open problem.
7.2 Games with two-sided information
In this work we focused on the two polar cases of symmetric and one sided
information. It would be interesting to characterize the functions V of pair
of partitions (P1,P2) for which there is a p and sets of actions and payoﬀ
functions (gk)k∈K such that V (P1,P2) = vP1,P2(p,(gk)k∈K).
197.3 General information structures
In this paper we restricted ourselves to games in which the information struc-
ture is deﬁned by a pair of partitions. One could more generally deﬁne the
value of information as a function of general information structures (namely
functions from K to probability distributions over a ﬁnite set of signals) and
ask which functions are value of information functions.
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